LECTURE #2: Schaeffer and Chesterton on Reason

I. Some Common Themes

  1. A contrast between reason/rationality (good) and ``rationalism'' (bad).
  2. True vs. false pragmatism. Both emphasize livability as a test of truth.
  3. Both agree that our ability to think and to know is dependent on a Christian worldview, and that, consequently, this ability is at risk as the culture moves away from its Christian foundations.

II. Francis Schaeffer (1912-1984)

Part of a very conservative Presbyterian (Reformed) tradition. Broke away from mainline Presb. church in the 1920's over the fundamentalist/modernist controversy. Became a missionary to Switzerland, founded L'Abri Fellowship (French for ``shelter'').

A. Some questions to think about as you read Schaeffer:

  1. What does he mean by "metaphysical necessity"? What is necessary? What is it necessary for? (Ditto for "epistemological necessity".)
  2. What is Schaeffer's overall strategy for defending Christianity? What are its strengths and weaknesses?
  3. What does Schaeffer mean by "personality" or "mannishness"? What is included, and why?
  4. What does Schaeffer mean by "verbal" or "propositional communication"? Why is it so important that God communicate to us verbally/propositionally? What is the relationship between verbal and non-verbal communication?
  5. What does Schaeffer mean by "rationality" and "rationalism"? Why is the first good and the second bad?

B. Schaeffer on metaphysical necessity

  1. Two problems or two phenomena to be explained: the complexity of the universe, and the personality of man.
  2. These two phenomena are part of God's "general revelation" (as opposed to the "special revelation" contained in the Bible).
  3. Connections to two traditional arguments for God's existence: the cosmological (or first cause) argument, and the teleological argument (argument from design).
  4. Schaeffer assumes that if reality is capable of being understood rationally, it must have a "beginning" (a first cause, itself uncaused).
  5. Schaeffer also assumes that whatever we find in the effect (such as order & complexity, or personality) must already be present in the cause in some way.
Traditional principle of causation: every finite/contingent event has a cause, and every quality (or nature or essence) present in the effect must also be present in the cause, either actually or eminently. (That is, the cause must have the very same quality, or else a quality of a "higher" order, from which the quality of the effect can be derived.)

Is this traditional principle true? (Consider this example: mixing two chemicals at low temperature, resulting in a compound at much higher temperature. Or, mixing two materials of different colors, resulting in a material of a third color.)

Is it (as Schaeffer implicitly claims) a precondition of all rational understanding?

What is the essence/nature of personality, and why must the beginning (first cause) be personal itself?

C. Schaeffer on epistemological necessity (What is necessary for us to have genuine knowledge?)

  1. The problem of universals. A major issue in the Middle Ages. How is it possible for many particulars to share a common nature or essence?
  2. Science requires universals, since all scientific laws must be stated in general terms, and these terms must have a real meaning that is independent of our practices and conventions. "A correlation between the categories of my mind and the world" ( HTNS, p. 77)
  3. There has to be a balance, a place for both particulars and universals. The Platonism of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages tended to deny the reality or importance of particulars altogether. Since the Renaissance (even the late Middle Ages), the emphasis has shifted to particulars. Without universals, the particulars are threatened with meaninglessness.
  4. In addition to scientific knowledge, Schaeffer is also concerned with our knoweldge of ourselves (knowledge of ethical universals and of the meaning of human life), knowledge of the difference between reality and fantasy, and knowledge of others (real communication). The meaning of "tea" (HTNS, pp. 73-4).
  5. The solution: humans were created/designed to know reality, and God Himself communicates to us verbally/propositionally. True, but not exhaustive, knowledge is then possible.

III. Chesterton on Reason

Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874-1936) Wrote Orthodoxy (1908), The Everlasting Man (1925), the Father Brown stories. Journalist and author. Critic of atheism and pantheism. Leader of the "distributist" movement in Britain (with Hillaire Belloc), a third way between capitalism and socialism. Joined Catholic Church in 1922.

A. Chesterton's Critique of Rationalism (The Maniac, The Blue Cross, The Secret Garden)

  1. Materialism has a kind of "insane simplicity" (p. 225).
  2. Insanity = reason without a healthy root, reason in the absence of sound first principles.
  3. The sane man (the mystic) cares more for truth than for consistency.

B. Chesterton's Defense of Reason (The Suicide of Thought, The Blue Cross, Miracle at Moon Crescent)

  1. For the materialist, thought is nothing but "movements in the brain of a bewildered ape" (p. 235)
  2. Reasons requires faith: "it is an act of faith to assert that our thoughts have any relation to reality at all." Authority in the Christian religion is ultimately a defense of "the authority of a man to think." (p. 237)
  3. Like Schaeffer, Chesterton introduces the problem of universals. Takes "evolutionism" as a modern example of nominalism (the denial of universals). H. G. Wells: "all chairs are quite different." Taken literally, this is self-contradictory (p. 238).
  4. Like Schaeffer, Chesterton appeals to a true pragmatism, a concern for genuine human needs. "One of the first of human needs is to be something more than a pragmatist." (p. 240)
  5. Attacks the worship of the human will (Nietzsche, G. B. Shaw). "To preach egoism is to practice altruism." "The worship of the will is the negation of will. To admire mere choice is to refuse to choose." (p. 242) All willing is an act of self-limitation. Contrast Nietzsche & Joan of Arc.

For next time:

What does Lewis mean by "naturalism"? What does Lewis mean by the "validity" of human thought? Why is it supposed to follow that, if naturalism is true, human thought cannot have validity?